Armored cruiser Gromoboy 1904 Armored cruiser Gromoboy. Russian fleet. Design and construction

Or Ilyin's day is the day of the national calendar. "Gromoboy" armored cruiser of the Russian fleet. Thunderbolt (film, 1995) Thunderbolt (film, 2006) ... Wikipedia

Thunderbolt (film)- “Gromoboy” armored cruiser of the Russian fleet. Thunderbolt (film, 1995) Thunderbolt (film, 2006) ... Wikipedia

First rank cruiser "Russia" type- Cruiser of the first rank Type "Russia" (2 units) Russia Development of the project of the cruiser "Rurik". Laid down on May 20, 1895. Launched on April 30, 1896. Entered into service on September 13, 1897 (St. Petersburg/Baltic Plant; cor. engineer A.P. Titov). Was part of 1... ... Military encyclopedia

"Thunderbolt"- THUNDERBOY, armor. cruise 1 rub., 13.220 tn. water displacement, built 1899 to Balt. plant, speed 20 knots, art.: IV 8″, XXII 6″, XXV speed. and IV machine gun; mine: 4 subs. apparatus. From the beginning Russian. Japanese wars of 1904-05 was part of the detachment... ... Military encyclopedia

Cruiser Aurora"

Cruiser Aurora"- “Aurora” Modern view of the cruiser “Aurora” at night Basic information Type Cruiser of the 1st rank ... Wikipedia

Cruiser Aurora- “Aurora” Modern view of the cruiser “Aurora” at night Basic information Type Cruiser of the 1st rank ... Wikipedia

"THUNDERBOY"- Russian armored cruiser. Navy, Russian participant Japanese and 1st world. wars. Entered service in 1900. Waterism. 12,359 t, speed 20.1 knots (37 km/h): armament: 4,203 mm, 22,152 mm ord., up to 30 rapid fire ord. smaller caliber, 2 inlets. min... ... Military encyclopedic dictionary

Armored cruiser- a class of cruisers that existed in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. They were the second most powerful class of warships of the leading navies after battleships. The most characteristic feature of armored cruisers was the armored belt along the waterline. How... ... Wikipedia

Gromoboi (Thunderbolt)- "Gromoboi" ("Thunderbolt") cruiser (Russia) Type: cruiser (Russia). Displacement: 12564 tons. Dimensions: 144 m x 20.7 m x 8.8 m. Power plant: three-shaft, triple expansion steam engines. Maximum speed: 20 knots. Weapon:... ... Encyclopedia of ships

Books

• Ocean cruiser "Rurik". A feat higher than the Varangian, Nikolai Pakhomov. The legendary cruiser “Rurik”... Its life began unusually, and the service, from the first, Kiel, parade, to the last, in the Sea of ​​Japan, took place like one continuous holiday to the sounds of the anthem, marches...

L. A. Kuznetsov
Shipbuilding. L: "Shipbuilding", 1989. No. 12

Material prepared by: Georgy Shishov

The Navy Ministry's passion in the second half of the last century for building cruisers for combat operations, primarily on sea routes, culminated in the creation of highly autonomous ocean cruisers Rurik and Rossiya. The second of them was still on the slipway when the Naval Department, after considering the plan for further shipbuilding in the report of the Admiral General dated July 3, 1895, received the highest order to continue building cruisers of the "Russia" type; and after 12 days the construction of a third such ship was approved.

The desire to have a more advanced cruiser than Rossiya led to the development of a completely new project, in which its future builders took part - senior assistants to the shipbuilder K. Ya. Averin and V. X. Offenberg. Fulfilling the order of the Admiral General, MTK on June 18, 1896. gave the order to the manager of the Baltic Shipyard, senior shipbuilder S.K. Ratnik, to immediately begin drawing up possible “considerations”, and then to reworking the drawings of the cruiser “Russia”; it was necessary to take the same hull as a basis, install three main steam engines of equal power under the armored deck instead of two main and one auxiliary, improve artillery protection with the help of “separate casemates or in another way,” using the weight of the abolished double engine casemate [3].

On August 12, MTK reviewed four ship options presented by the Baltic Shipyard with a displacement of 12336, 13100, 14000 and 15385 tons, the latter being an enlarged battleship "Peresvet" (length 156.9, width 21.9, draft 8.15 m, speed 20 knots, four 254 and thirteen 152 mm guns). Of all the projects, preference was given to the first one as it most fully meets the presented conditions. The acting chairman of the MTK, Rear Admiral P. N. Wulf, proposed, in the case of using Krupp armor, to reduce the thickness of the side belt from 203 to 152 mm, and with the saved 132 tons to protect not only all four 203 mm, but also twelve (instead of eight project) of sixteen 152 mm guns. The revision of the drawings, taking into account changes made to the composition of small-caliber artillery, armor and other elements, was completed by November 30, 1896, and on March 11 of the following year the project received approval from the Ministry of Transport and Communications; however, according to S.K. Ratnik, it had nothing in common with the “Russia”, moreover, due to the modified design of the underwater wooden plating and the slightly increased displacement of the other steel and contours of the ship [Z].

According to the specifications, the cruiser had a length along the cargo waterline of 144.17 m (the largest with a ram 146.6 m), a width with wooden underwater plating of 20.88, a recess when fully loaded with a keel and false keel of 7.9 m, a displacement of 12359 tons. Load items consisted of the mass of the hull with steel flooring for deck armor and useful things (4757 tons), armor (2169.46), artillery with ammunition (832.5), mine weapons, dynamos, 50 spheroconic mines and a net barrier (166, 28), mechanisms, boilers with 145 tons of boiler water (1988.15), a normal supply of coal (1756), two mines (length 17 m, speed 14 knots) and the same number of steam (length 12.2 m, speed 9 and 9 .5 knots) boats and rowing vessels (two 20-oared longboats, 6-oared yawls and a whaleboat, respectively, 14 light boats, one 16-oared and one 12-oared work boat each) (57.77), 35 officers and 750 men . crew, supplies, provisions for four months, fresh water (85.3 tons) for 14 days, skipper's supplies, three steel masts, two Admiralty masts with rods (each about 5.9 tons) and two spare ones (Martina 7 tons each) anchors, stop anchor, three ropes, two mains (319.5 m each) and one spare (213) anchor chains with a caliber of 66.6 mm (617.8 t); The displacement reserve was 14 tons.

The construction of the ship in the new stone boathouse of the Baltic Shipyard began on June 14, 1897, and on December 7 of the same year, a new cruiser called "Thunderbreaker" was included in the fleet inventory; The official laying took place on May 7 of the following year.

The fore- and sternpost, the rudder post, the steering frame with rudderpiece, the outer casings of the propeller shafts and brackets were cast from bronze; a vertical internal keel with a height of 990.6 mm was assembled from steel sheets with a thickness of 15.9 in the middle part of the hull, and 14.3 mm at the ends; horizontal - consisted of an external 15.9 mm along the entire length and an internal 19 mm in the middle part, 14.3 mm in the bow and stern. Throughout the double bottom (sheathing thickness 7.9-14.3 mm) between 28 and 102 sp. Four stringers or internal side keels were installed on each side; within the same limits, the spacing of frames made of angle steel and 2-shaped strips was 1219, and further to the ends - 914 mm. From the inner "part of the armor belt along its height, the spacing was 610 mm. Waterproof bulkheads with a thickness of 6.35 and 8.7 mm at 28, 32, 36, 46, 56, 66, 76, 86-87 and 95 sp. were located from the outer plating (thickness from 11.1 to 19) to the armored deck (living) and were reinforced with vertical corner posts on one side and T-shaped horizontal strips on the other. Longitudinal bulkheads formed side corridors, deck beams were made of box steel, and tubular pillars - made of iron. The flooring of the upper deck was planned to be made of 76-mm square pine bars or 57-mm teak boards (on all other decks - linoleum). The underwater part was sheathed first with one 101.6-mm layer of teak boards, and then 1.58- mm copper sheets. In the middle part of the hull, bilge keels (length 60.96 m) with a height of 609.6 mm were attached; the main keel (teak), on top of which a 127-mm oak false keel was installed, was attached directly to the outer steel plating. The cost of the hull was 4148855 rub.

Reservation (688 thousand rubles) - 152 mm side belt (length 72.2, height 2.3 m) between 36 and 95 sp. from Harvey's armor (the domestic Obukhov and Izhora factories had not yet mastered Krupp armor), decreasing towards the lower edge to 101.6 mm (1.44 m below the waterline) and mounted on a 76.2 mm larch lining; it was limited to 152 mm traverses running on top of the armored deck (the thickness of the chromium-nickel sheets laid on a 12.7 mm steel deck was 25.4 mm in the horizontal part and from 50.8 to 63.5 mm at the bevels to the sides and extremities), but not reaching the center plane. The remaining traverses are for 32, 36, 40 and 95 sp. on the battery, living (armored) decks, as well as between the upper and forecastle, they had a thickness of 50.8 mm. Casemates from the outside, inside and on top, the conning tower (as on the "Russia") were protected by 120.6-, 50.8-, 25.4- and 305 mm, respectively, and four boiler hatches and elevator feed casings - 38, 1 mm armor. Large hatches on the armored deck had gratings made of iron (203x15.8 mm) strips, and the rest were equipped with armored covers. Due to reservation limitations, the stern 203 mm guns had to be mounted on open deck installations with shields, and the bow ones had to be placed in a common bow casemate with a 50.8 mm longitudinal bulkhead.

Machine installation worth 3 million 100 thousand rubles. included three four-cylinder triple expansion steam engines with a total indicated power of 14,500 hp. With. at 120 rpm, designed for the cruiser to reach a 19-knot speed; the three-blade propellers were made of “gun metal”, and the two side propellers (diameter about 4870 mm) were located 762 mm above the average (4570), and their shafting had a slope of 2° towards the nose. The bow engine room, where the onboard vehicles were located, was separated by a 9.5 mm longitudinal bulkhead. Three centrifugal circulation pumps (each with a flow rate of about 600 t/h) with separate drives could be used as drainage pumps. Steam was produced by 32 water-tube boilers of the Belleville system (working pressure 17 kg/cm2) model 1894, installed in four sections. Coal consumption at full power was 100, and in afterburner mode - 125 kg/h (indicated power 16,500 hp at 125 rpm); in the engine and boiler rooms there were two Worthington fire pumps, and in each boiler room there were four Friedman ejectors.

Replenishment of drinking and boiler water was provided by two desalination plants and three evaporators of the Krug system; the indicated power of all 70 auxiliary mechanisms reached 2270 hp. With. , and most of them (8 drainage turbines of 550 and 2 of 250 t/h, three spiers, fans, winches and other equipment) had electric drives. There were two 75 cm searchlights on each mast; The cruiser was illuminated by 1316 incandescent lamps. All consumers were provided with electricity from six dynamos (105 V, two 1000 A each and four 640 A each) manufactured by Union and Simmens and Halske. Intra-ship communications - bells, loud bells, speaking pipes and 46 telephones of the system of Lieutenant E.V. Kolbasyev. In the control areas of the steering wheel, which had manual, steam and electric drives, in the central post and conning tower, electric steering position indicators were installed.

The artillery armament consisted (in parentheses the combat kit for all guns is indicated) of four 203-mm (440), sixteen 152-mm (2880) Kane systems (barrel length 45 calibers), twenty-four 75-mm (7200), eight 47- mm (6480) on Captain Meller's machines. sixteen 37-mm (9720) guns (eight of them on the foremast combat top) and two 63.5-mm Baranovsky landing guns. The guns were supplied by the Obukhov plant, the elevator feed by Metallic, winches by Duflon, artillery fire control devices by N. K. Geisler and Co. plant. The mine armament (Putilov plant) included four onboard underwater 380-mm devices for Whitehead mines (stock of 12 units) 5.18 m long and spheroconic mines - 16 in the bow, 34 in the stern cellars; they were placed using longboats and steam boats, each of which was armed with a throwing apparatus. The mine boats had two folding 380-mm devices for Whitehead mines with a length of 4.57 m, all four boats had one 47-mm Hotchkiss gun and a machine gun.

The plant managed to catch up with the resulting backlog associated with the production of machines and boilers, and by the time the ship was launched (May 8, 1899), all 32 boilers and a significant part of the auxiliary mechanisms were in place. True, due to the hasty assembly of the boilers during the first voyage, various problems had to be constantly fixed; the machines were installed at a high rate - for example, the onboard ones were tested in the factory workshop in September, the middle one - in October 1899, their mooring tests were carried out on October 26 and November 9, respectively, i.e. after only 38 days, that the ship’s commander, captain 1st rank K P. Jessen defined [Z] as a brilliant result. On November 12, tugs took the Gromoboy for completion to Kronstadt, but in the Sea Canal the caravan encountered solid ice and the cruiser went on under its own power alone; on the Peterhof meridian, a fresh northwest wind and ice pressed it to the southern edge of the canal, and then transported it across it. The help of the approaching ships was in vain, and only after a change in the wind and an increase in the water level did the ship refloat on its own (November 15). All these days, the main engines and boilers worked, according to the commander, flawlessly. An inspection at the dock on April 19, 1900 revealed damage to 980 sheets of copper plating, but the hull itself, as the commission determined, could last another 30 years.

Factory tests carried out in September 1900 were unsuccessful. Due to the large trim on the bow, the cruiser developed only 18 knots, although the engines were running at full speed; while sailing, the ship buried its bow deeply, and water flooded not only the copper plating, which reached a height of 9.75 m from the keel, but also the fairleads with part of the bow decoration; at the stern the load line (8.2 m from the keel) [Z] was clearly visible, while the hull shook violently.

After the trim was removed, the official six-hour tests were successfully completed (October 5, 1900). With a bow of 7.67, stern of 8.18 m and a displacement of 123^ tons, the Thunderbolt easily reached an average speed of 20.1 knots; separately, the left, middle and right cars developed, without afterburner, respectively, an indicated power of 5165, 5274.45 and 5056.59 hp. With. (total 15496 hp) at 123.7, 117.5 and 124.2 rpm. Particularly noted was the complete absence of overloading of the cruiser, even with all the ship's stores, the first use on a domestic ship on a large scale of insulating rooms and cellars with layers of pressed cork; “Moreover, at the suggestion of S.K. Ratnik, the MTK recognized it as possible to sheathe the upper deck from below with iron sheets in order to prevent fire when shells explode inside the ship.

After all the tests, "Thunderbolt" left Libau on November 28, 1900 for a foreign voyage, in order to later join the Pacific squadron. With the receipt of all supplies, trim on the bow (0.7 m) again appeared; during strong seas, water splashes often reached the upper bridge, and due to the single sealing, all the portholes began to leak. It was possible to get rid of the trim by moving six spare anchor-chain bridges (12 tons), grate bars (40) to the outer aft rooms and additionally laying 46 tons of cast iron ballast and 120 tons of coal in briquettes. Taking into account the fourteen tower-like shields installed in the casemates for the 203- and 152-mm guns installed in the casemates by decision of the Ministry of Transport, the displacement increased by 216 tons. On the way to Vladivostok, the Thunderbolt visited Melbourne and Sydney in April-May on the occasion of the opening of the parliament of the Australian Federation; he arrived at his final destination on July 17, 1901 [Z].

The experience of the first voyages, according to K. P. Jessen, showed that the cruiser has excellent seaworthiness, and its excellent lines and engines make it possible to develop up to 20.3 knots and sail against the wind and waves at a fairly significant speed. With a smooth roll (5.5-6 swings per minute) and a roll of up to 9°, the keel was distinguished by its rapidity, especially on a large wave, but this did not prevent the use of artillery. With full coal pits (2324 tons) and a sufficient supply of fresh water (up to 1000 tons), the cruising range reached 5000-5500 miles at an economic speed, and the supply of provisions allowed them to stay at sea for 100 days. Among the shortcomings, the unsatisfactory performance of all three steering drives, ventilation, and spiers was noted. uneconomical boilers and refrigeration machines, as well as insufficient evaporator performance. The absence of coal necks on the upper deck also caused criticism, since normal loading of fuel through the side ports (between the battery and living decks) could only be carried out in the harbor or in calm weather. Having visited the cruiser in October 1900, Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov noted that despite the presence of luxurious officer quarters, he “was struck by the lack of any amenities for the life of sailors on our new ships” [Z].

During the Russian-Japanese War, "Gromoboy" as part of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers took part in combat operations on the enemy's sea lanes. Possessing better armor protection than the Rossiya, the ship nevertheless suffered significant personnel losses in a battle with Japanese cruisers on August 1, 1904 (94 people were killed, 182 were wounded). This was explained by the order of the cruiser command to constantly keep servants at the small-caliber guns, although they could not participate in the battle due to the long firing distances [I]. It took almost two months to repair the damage received; however, during the first trip to sea (September 30, 1904), the Thunderbolt collided with Klykov's can in Posyet Bay and severely damaged the bottom on the left side (about 50 pieces). Repairs to the dry deck, from which the cruiser Bogatyr had to be temporarily withdrawn, were completed only by February 9 of the following year [I]. During this time, six 152-mm cannons were additionally installed on the upper deck (three on each side), and in April, 31.7-mm tower-like shields and separate armored casemates were installed (the thickness of the sheets on the side and roof sides was 12.7, traverses - 9 .5 mm). The stern 203 mm guns had 38.1 mm traverses installed. By moving the stern one towards the bow and moving the bow 152-mm gun to the forecastle, the firing angles were increased. All this significantly strengthened the broadside salvo and improved the protection of artillery, the quality of fire of which was increased thanks to the use of horizontal-base rangefinders Barr and Strood. The number of 75-mm guns was reduced to nineteen, and 37-mm to two. On May 11, 1905, the cruiser had to endure another test. Having gone out to sea to test the range of the new Telefunken radiotelegraph (115 miles), he hit a mine (the left side, under the first stoker). The ship was able to return to Vladivostok on its own, but due to repairs, it no longer participated in hostilities [I].

Returning to the Baltic, the Thunderbolt was put in for major repairs on July 7, 1906. The mechanisms “torn” during the war were in particularly poor condition; Thus, the boilers, according to the boiler master of the Baltic Plant G.N. Revenko, were a “complete ruin” against the background of the decent appearance of the “Russia” boilers, made in France and in operation for much longer. The Baltic, Franco-Russian and Kronstadt Shipping Plants took over the repairs. In place of the stern mine devices, two 320 A dynamos were installed, and the bow mine devices were replaced with 457 mm devices. The stern 203-mm guns were finally protected by a common casemate made of Krupp armor (76.2 mm walls, 25.4 mm roof), and in the aft part of the admiral's salon, also in an armored casemate (50.8 and 19.5 mm), they installed two 152 mm guns moved from the extremities; of the rest of the artillery, four 75- and 47-mm guns remained. Armored cabins for Barr and Strood rangefinders were installed in the bow and stern, and the protection of additional casemates (roof 19 mm) on the upper deck was strengthened to 50.8 mm. There are now two masts. - the mainmast was moved closer to the stern, and in place of the foremast, a repaired mizzen mast was installed, placing one 90-cm searchlight and an observation platform on each of the whirlwinds. Tests carried out on September 29, 1910 revealed poor quality repairs to the mechanisms - developing a power of only 9979 hp. s., the cars began to get very hot. The mechanisms were tested again on July 14 of the following year, everything went well: at partial speed, the average speed of the ship (displacement 12643 tons, deepening at the bow 8, stern 8.2 m, total indicated power of the machines 13337.2 hp) was 18.5 knot According to the 1907 classification, the Gromoboy was classified as an armored cruiser, and since 1915 - as a cruiser.

During the First World War, the Thunderbolt was part of the second brigade of cruisers; at the suggestion of the flagship artillery officer, senior lieutenant G. N. Pell, it was re-armed (June 1915) with two 203 mm guns (on the forecastle and poop), removing both 152 mm bow and all 75 and 47 mm guns; reinforcements under them were carried out by the Sandvik ship dock and the mechanical plant in Helsingfors. The elevation angle of the 203- and 152-mm guns was 17.55° and 17°, and the total ammunition was 750 and 5000 rounds, respectively. With the new weapons, the Thunderbolt could already provide worthy resistance to the German Roon-class cruiser; Later, new elevators and two 63.5- and 47-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed. The ship had two radio stations (2 and 8 kW), carried 200 minutes on board; at the beginning of 1917, its total displacement reached 13,200 tons. In November of the same year, the Thunderbolt moved to Kronstadt and ended the campaign on February 1, 1918; from May until it was sold for scrap in 1922, it was in long-term storage. While being towed to Germany, the cruiser was thrown by a storm onto the outport in the Liepaja area; it was subsequently dismantled by private firms.

Thus ended the story of the most advanced cruiser in the series begun by Rurik and Rossiya. And it is not the fault of its creators that the Thunderbolt, intended for action in the ocean, carried out combat operations in a limited naval theater, and participation in the battle with Japanese ships on August 1, 1904 only confirmed its inadequacy to the assigned tasks.

LITERATURE

1. Egoriev V.E. Operations of Vladivostok cruisers during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. L.-M., Voenizdat, 1939, p. 7.232, 263.
2. Shipbuilding, 1979, No. 12, p. 57-60; 1980. No. 1, p. 63-65.
3. TsGAVMF, f. 401, op. 1, d. 1024; f. 417, op. 1, d. 2181, 2182, 2214, 2282; f. 418, op. 1, d. 1686; f. 421, op. 1, no. 1277, op. 3, d. 669, op. 4, d. 545, 766, op. 8, d. 57, 58; f. 425, op. 1, no. 30; 427. op. 1, d. 224; f. 479, op. 3. d. 171, 228; f. 719, op. 1, d. 1, 24, 31, 35; f. 930, op. 25, no. 195, 227, 228, 240.
4. Reports on the Maritime Department 1897-1906, St. Petersburg.
5. Ships and auxiliary vessels of the Soviet Navy (1917-1927). M., Voenizdat, 1981, p. 20, 21.

The victorious, magnificent and majestic cruiser "Gromoboy" once rocked on the waves of the Pacific Ocean and guarded the borders of imperial Russia. He even got a special name; power and strength seemed to be inherent in this amazing vessel.

General information

According to the primary idea, this ship was supposed to become a worthy successor. At that time, no one could yet imagine that the Thunderbolt was the very last armored cruiser in the country. The ship turned out to be powerful and met all the requirements of its time. After all the documentary nuances had been settled, and after the ship had passed all the planned tests, it was sent to the Far East in order to complement the Russian Pacific squadron. Only the cruiser "Thunderbolt" seemed to be haunted by troubles and failures.

History of creation

At that time, when the Thunderbolt was still in the project, Russia’s main naval competitor was Great Britain with its strongest ships. Emperor Nicholas II decided to spend exactly seven years building completely new cruisers that could compete with any power at sea. In 1895, it was decided to take as the basis for the project the drawings of the cruiser "Russia", which had already sailed the seas and was very successful.

K. Ya. Averin and F. H. Offenberg are shipbuilders who were entrusted with the creation of the Thunderbolt. The emperor personally approved them for this position, and also approved each of the drawings. According to them, the cruiser was supposed to have several steam engines installed, as well as armor exceeding twenty centimeters in thickness. The Baltic Plant was chosen as the place where the giant was to emerge. At the same time, only the highest quality steel was used in the construction. And with a weight of fifteen thousand tons, this giant also had to be fast.

It was decided to begin construction of the ship in 1897. It took years to implement such a large-scale project; the biggest difficulty was the supply of expensive and high-quality steel to the Baltic Plant. Big problems arose related to workers' strikes and the reconstruction of enterprises. This slowed down the launch of the ship. And yet, a few years later, the cruiser Gromoboy set out on her first voyage.

Features of construction

Unfortunately, troubles with the Thunderbolt began at the construction docks. The fact is that the builders were forced to change the length and thickness of the ship's armor. According to the project, it was supposed to be twenty centimeters thick, but it became only five centimeters, which, as many believed, was no good. Also, the guns did not have armor, for the protection of which only metal shields were prepared. All this, of course, is regrettable, although there was a positive moment. The ship ended up being lighter than planned. This allowed him to achieve greater speed on the water.

Armament

This cruiser could reach a maximum speed of up to nineteen knots per hour, and its armament included a pair of Baranovsky cannons, several underwater torpedo tubes, anti-mine artillery units, and more than five hundred different-caliber guns.

The cruiser "Thunderbolt", whose weapons cannot be called weak, "ate" a lot of coal, so all the holds were filled to the brim with it and ammunition. If we talk about specifics, even though the cruiser began to weigh twelve tons instead of the planned fifteen, in order to maintain full speed it was necessary to take at least 1,700 tons of coal on each voyage.

Trial tests

The first launch on the water cannot be called completely successful. It was carried out in 1900 and revealed all the defects and shortcomings of the construction, the main one of which was that the ship simply could not float; when moving, it immediately began to tilt forward strongly, even buried its bow in the ground, which is why it was filled with water all holds and lower decks. Added to this was the fact that it vibrated very strongly while moving, which was a problem for aimed shooting from a cruiser. It was difficult for the sailors to move around the decks. All problems were worked on tirelessly, and by the end of the year, each of them was successfully fixed. One can even say that the last test met all expectations, because the cruiser "Thunderbolt" outstripped itself. He managed to reach a speed of over twenty knots per hour.

The Thunderbolt, as planned, was supposed to make its first flight to the Far East; it was already almost winter. Only now problems in the design have surfaced again. The captain immediately noticed that the ship was tilting nose down, and significantly so. Instead of sitting down again to the calculations and fixing the matter properly, the engineers simply decided to move the heavy anchor and part of the cargo to the rear of the ship, which corrected the matter. Finally, the ship went on course.

"Thunderbolt" in action

Those sailors who had the opportunity to serve on the Thunderbolt later recalled that the ship was quite comfortable and suitable for long voyages. And that the captain, and the entire crew, were very proud of the speed that the cruiser was able to develop. In 1901, the team even had a chance to take part in the celebrations of the adoption of the Constitution in Australia.

The ship had a supply of fresh water of more than a thousand tons; the crew had the opportunity not to enter the port at all and continue the journey without stopping for more than a hundred days in a row. This is, of course, a big plus, but there was also a huge minus for the ship. The sailors had to live in terrible conditions on the ship, because there was practically no free space on the ship. It was difficult both physically and mentally.

It was this ship that once alarmed the whole of Great Britain, since, unlike other units of the Russian fleet, it could be a worthy competitor to any English ship. In England, they began modernizing the flotilla as soon as the Thunderbolt left the docks, and by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain was again ahead of Russia in shipbuilding.

And during the war, the cruiser had a very hard time. The Japanese caused a lot of damage to the ship, so the Thunderbolt again had to undergo long-term repair work, which lasted right up to 1906. Then the cruiser showed itself during training missions, and in the First World War it again fought with the enemy. But at the beginning of the revolution, it was ordered to be docked for repairs, from where it never went out to sea. It was sold for scrap.

Thus, the wonderful cruiser, which, according to contemporaries’ descriptions, could have served for many more years, was simply scrapped. But it’s a great pity! In the memory of descendants, the cruiser "Gromoboy" is a real hero.

I strongly welcome you! Boris Vitalievich, good time of year! Likewise. What did you get stuck on last time? Then we talked about the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, i.e. how our countries came to the point of declaring war. Well, now it probably makes sense to talk about what we fought with: the armed forces, weapons, and so on. Those. It would seem that you look at the globe, we really like to do history on the globe, and there is a huge Russian Empire, and tiny, tiny Japan. Well, strictly speaking, it is really tiny, it was much smaller in population than the Russian Empire, although not as it looks on the map: the Russian Empire had 170 million inhabitants at that moment, the Japanese Empire had 42 million inhabitants, as far as I remember. Somewhere in the mid-80s, I remember, I once got into an atlas - there were such good Soviet atlases - and was surprised to see that there were 117 million Russians and 117 million Japanese. This Japan is not visible near Russia, but we are about the same now. Now yes. There are more Russians than Japanese, but there are fewer Russians, perhaps even smaller. Those. There are now more than 120 million Japanese. Well, even 40 is still good, i.e. this is a decent power. Quite, which at that time was developing quite rapidly. Those. After the Meiji Revolution there, Japan actually grew very significantly every year. Strictly speaking, like the Soviet Union under Stalin - somewhere like that, the pace of development was the same. But it’s true that the Japanese had a very low start, i.e. from deep feudalism decisively to capitalism. By this time they had already won the Sino-Japanese War, received a colossal indemnity, received warships and, in fact, received international recognition as almost white people who have the right to own colonies and not be a colony. Those. made their way into a number of leading world powers. Well, of course, the forces, taken as a whole, of Russia and Japan were poorly comparable, after all, Russia was much larger, had a larger economy and had a more than 4-fold superiority in population. Those. there was a definite advantage. But our war was not between Russia and Japan, let’s say that Japan is trying to capture Russia or Russia is trying to capture Japan. Colonial war - i.e. who will rob the Chinese. And here Japan is nearby, Russia is generally far away, i.e. The main resources of the Russian Empire are located to the west of the Urals, and then to the east of the Urals, God knows how long it will take to get to China, to Manchuria. So this is what the Russian army was like. Sorry, I’ll interrupt you: in those days the BAM had already been laid there, no? No, they built the Trans-Siberian Railway. Was there a railway? Yes, but it was a single track, i.e. on light ballast, with light rails, i.e. limited train capacity, limited speed - no more than 30 versts per hour. And so, in fact, by the beginning of the Russian-Japanese War, the Trans-Siberian Railway had a capacity of 6 pairs of trains per day. Not rich. Well, the trains then had a much smaller carrying capacity than now - the trains were shorter, the locomotives were weaker. Well, accordingly, if by ship, then it is from the Baltic or from the Black Sea, or through Suez... Through 3 oceans. Or around Africa, who the hell. Far. Yes. Therefore, it turns out that the theater was largely isolated. True, there were also... there was a certain Russian population, and there were Cossack troops stationed just along the border with China, i.e. there were certain human resources. But, of course, they cannot be compared with the Japanese 40 million. And so, in principle, our entire theater of military operations “hung” either at sea and a single-track railway, or simply on a “single-track” if the Japanese dominate the sea. But this is exactly the situation from a logistics point of view. And now: what were the armed forces like? The Russian Empire had the largest peacetime army at that time, i.e. the army itself was about 1 million 100 thousand people, and all the armed forces were about 1 million 350 thousand people. For comparison: the Japanese army numbered 160 thousand people in peacetime. Incomparable, yes. The system, the organization of the armed forces was quite similar: we had all-class conscription, not universal - our economy was a little lacking for universal conscription. At the same time, they served in military service for 4 years, then they were in the reserves, then they were assigned to the militia. So, those who were not called up for military service were immediately enlisted in the militia warriors. Those. This is how, in theory, the service should have been built. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, we had about 2 million trained reserves for the army that we have. The Japanese have a peacetime army of 160 thousand people, according to the report of Kuropatkin, who carefully studied Japan and was considered, by the way, one of the brilliant strategists at that time, well, before the Russo-Japanese War, before the start, and so he assessed the mobilization abilities of the Japanese army taking into account and reservists and territorial troops, like 375 thousand people. The picture in fact was somewhat different: the Japanese took over the Prussian system, i.e. they have 3 years of military service, 4 years 4 months in reserve, and then they are transferred to the reserve. They also had all-class conscription, because they also did not require universal conscription, and they managed to mobilize 600 thousand people at the beginning of the war. Not bad! They had a country divided into 12 divisional districts, and, in fact, they created an army of 13 divisions - 12 infantry divisions and 1 guards, capital. And in each division a reserve brigade was created from artillerymen. Those. here are 13 divisions - 13 brigades, not counting cavalry units. These are the main parts. Next, here is what they had in reserve and in the militia, from which additional units were recruited for the territorial troops and... reserve divisions. That is, the Japanese managed, let’s say, to put more under arms than they had planned according to the standard mobilization scheme. And here we get a picture: we have 1 million 350 thousand, the Japanese have 160 thousand, but in the Far East we have 98 thousand people - these are in the troops and 24 thousand border guards, also, in principle, sometimes participated in battles, but they were subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. So, the Japanese have a clear superiority. Everything else we have is what we can deliver by rail and what we can supply via it. The Japanese army was well prepared, i.e. until 1901, not even - until 1902 it was prepared by German specialists, since 1902 it was prepared by English specialists, taking into account the experience of the Boer War. Our army was preparing, strictly speaking, according to its own best practices and, in principle, they were a little outdated by the time. For example, the Japanese mastered such a thing as digging in on the battlefield, but for us this was not a serious discipline. They practiced actions in loose formation, i.e., for example, if the Japanese have a 3-battalion regiment, then it has 6 companies deployed in rifle chains, 2 companies in platoon columns, so to speak, providing support, and 1 battalion in reserve. In our country, if a regiment is deployed, then we had a rather stupid binary system, or rather, a quaternary system - this is... in short, we have 4 regiments in a division, 4 battalions in a regiment, and 4 companies in a battalion. Those. Our regiment has 16 companies. So, 2 companies of them were deployed into rifle chains. Another 2 companies in platoon support, i.e. 4 companies are the first line. 4 companies are our second line in company columns, i.e. in fact, the reserve of those deployed units, and 2 battalions in reserve. Is this due to lack of war experience or was it somehow like that then? We played it safe, i.e. they overestimated the role of reserves and because of this underestimated the role of those troops that directly wage battle. During the war, this practice began to be revised, i.e. They began to withdraw from a regiment, for example, not 2 battalions, but only 1, to the reserve, and deploy 3 battalions into battle formations. Well, because otherwise it would not have been possible to fight properly at all - no matter what forces there were, there was still little fighting. We had much better cavalry in quality and much greater numbers than the Japanese. Those. better horse composition, better dressage. But the cavalry didn’t really “light up” in this war. The Japanese cavalry was smaller in number, but it was essentially riding infantry, i.e. she was not noticed in dashing cavalry attacks; in any combat clash she immediately dismounted, lay down and fired back from her rifles. Did the horses lie down too? They were driven to the rear. And so, if there had been a horse cabin, of course, our cavalry would have been much stronger. But there were no horse fellings in this war. Those. The Japanese placed their main emphasis on infantry. Of the advantages of our infantry over the Japanese, there was a clear advantage - we had a high culture of marching, i.e. You remember army drill, right? Ability to march in step. For example, a company is going somewhere cheerfully. The Japanese did not have time for this, so the troops marched almost in a crowd, i.e. a long, stretched column without formation, out of step, nothing. Because of this, their division's marching speed was 1.5-2 times lower than ours. How lovely! This, by the way, affected the speed of Japanese manners during the war. Yes. There is a well-known joke about: if you are so smart, why don’t you march in formation - it is, in general, not a joke. Well, yes, that is. The Japanese did not march in formation, by the way, based on the experience of the Russian-Japanese War, they took this very seriously, and by the next war with China they seriously trained their troops in this regard - they began to move much more vigorously. On the topic of the armament of this very infantry: our main infantry armament was the Mosin rifle: a repeating rifle made in 1891, it was subsequently improved, i.e., in principle, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War we had several modifications in service, but all they were called exactly the same. And this rifle, we often write that it was the best in the world. They usually forget to add: it was the best in the world in the year of its creation - in 1891. No, it really was the best in the world, at that time the Lebel repeating rifle, for example, which was the most common, was inferior in most respects to our Mosin rifle. There is a Gra rifle and others - they were worse. The same Japanese Murata rifle is old, it was also worse. But later newer rifles were created. What about Arisaka? "Arisaka" was newer, it was created with an eye on the German Mauser rifle of 1898. In principle, what were the differences between “Mosinka” and “Arisaka” - “Mosinka” we have a 3-line, i.e. caliber 7.62 mm. Japanese rifle 6.5 mm, i.e. caliber is smaller. "Arisaka" is a little lighter than the "mosinka", has a higher initial speed, better ballistics at close and medium distances, well, due to the higher initial speed. At long distances, the “mosinka” hits somewhat better due to the banally heavier bullet. It has a better effect on the enemy’s body, again, due to a heavier bullet. Has greater recoil due to the larger caliber. The Arisaka rifle has a special shield, for example, on the bolt, which protects the mechanism from dust and dirt. The Mosinka does not have such charms, but the mechanism is made so, let’s say, intelligently from the point of view of use in combat that the reliability is still high. Those. The Mosin rifle had very little fear of contamination. But due to the fact that our rifle is older, there are several archaic shortcomings: a less comfortable stock stock, a bolt handle pushed forward, i.e. with the Arisaka it is nearby, with the Mosinka it is further away, which makes it more difficult... not that it makes it more difficult - it throws off the aim more when reloading. We have a protruding magazine, while the Japanese have it recessed into the stock of the butt, i.e. it cannot be damaged by, say, an accidental blow. But all these moments, in fact, relate to taste, i.e. weapons can be considered virtually equivalent. Those. a company armed with Mosin rifles will be no worse in a firefight than a company armed with Arisaka rifles, or practically no worse. And the shootout in this case will be quite equivalent. Our militia units, which, for example, later fought on Sakhalin, were armed with a Berdan rifle, this is our previous one. It is single-shot, it was great in its time, but in the Russo-Japanese War it was completely outdated. The Japanese, just like us, only have enough Arisaka rifles for combat units and reservists. Those. their Landwehr, such a militia, was also armed with outdated rifles, i.e. then their reserve divisions fought with them. These are Murata rifles. Murat's rifle is worse than the Arisaka or Mosinka, but it is noticeably better than the Berdanka. But this, I say again, is part of, one might say, the second line. This is what concerns small arms. You can also remember machine guns, in fact. At the beginning of the war, there were no machine guns, practically none, neither we nor the Japanese, in the combat zone. Let's say we had 8 machine guns in the Manchurian army - that's nothing. The Japanese also began hostilities, in general, without machine guns. During the war, the number of machine guns increased greatly. Our main machine gun was the Maxim machine gun, which was produced under license from the Vickers company. It has colossal firepower, i.e. It can fire continuously, it is water-cooled, but we had it located on a fairly, and not just enough, but on a terribly bulky carriage, similar to a gun carriage - with high wheels, with a large shield. This is good against the Papuans, but against a well-armed enemy army it is not very good... Not great, right? The Japanese used, moreover, from a tripod, usually a Hotchkiss machine gun of either the 1897 or 1900 model. By the way, the Japanese have established its production. This is a rather interesting design, which not everyone will immediately recognize as a machine gun. For example, they used the so-called. rigid tape, i.e. He only shot truly reliably using a rigid tape. What it is? And this is a frame for 2.5 dozen rounds of ammunition, which you insert into the side, shoot, insert the next one, shoot. Those. This machine gun, due to such loading, and also because it was air-cooled, could not fire... provide such a barrage of fire as the Maxim machine gun. But it was much lighter, more compact, and, sadly, the Japanese had much more of them. Those. for example, in the battle of Mukden we had 56 machine guns, and the Japanese had 200. Wow! In addition to the Vickers machine gun, but, by the way, the Vickers, in addition to its large dimensions and very heavy weight, the Vickers/Maxim, which we had in service, had another very big drawback: the fact is that ours were bought a license in 1897 for the production of this machine gun, according to which the Vickers company received 50 feet sterling for each machine gun produced in our country for 10 years - this is approximately 500 rubles in gold. Not bad! For every. Vickers stood strong. Very. Those. right here, given that the production of machine guns was constantly increasing, i.e. At first we were aiming to produce a small amount, but here we got a very solid amount of money. Jumping to the side: what kind of machine gun did the Red Army soldier Sukhov have? He had a "Lewis" - this is a light machine gun of the First World War, this is a much later machine. So, let's continue. But, by the way, we also had a machine gun similar to this one. Well, that is. how - not similar in appearance, but similar in method of use. We purchased a Madsen submachine gun for fortresses, such as the Privetninsky fortresses and the fortresses of the Far East. Those. It would seem that this is exactly what the troops need, but it was purchased for fortresses. In fact, this is precisely a light machine gun, i.e. it has a casing, a bipod, and a magazine on top - a classic of the genre. Here, in fact, there were two such machine guns - “Vikkres” / “Maxim” and this “Madsen”, Danish. A good machine gun, but with all the disadvantages of a light machine gun - i.e. You cannot provide such a flurry of fire from it as from an easel one, and such accuracy of fire. This is a small weapon. Those. it can be considered, in principle, equivalent. Regarding artillery: our main cannon was a cannon from the Obukhov plant, model 1902. The Japanese have a 75-mm Arisaka cannon. The caliber is almost the same - 75 mm and 76.2 mm. But our gun belonged to what is called a “quick-firing gun,” i.e. rollback along the axis of the bore, quick-release bolt. Those. our gun provided a rate of fire quite easily up to 15 rounds per minute. Solid! The Japanese cannon was more compact than ours, but the entire carriage failed, i.e. It had no recoil devices at all. Access to the shutter is quite inconvenient and separate charging, i.e. rate of fire 4-5 rounds per minute. Plus, our gun had a superior rate of fire, i.e. our gun hit 10 versts, the Japanese one - 7. Our gun could shoot shrapnel at 6-7 versts, the Japanese - 4.5. Those. here our cannon surpassed the Japanese one in firepower, one might say, many times over, so the artillery can be considered much more advanced, for example, the field artillery. But the Japanese had a third of their artillery - these were mountain cannons, i.e. the same Arisaka guns, slightly lighter, which were disassembled and could be dragged on packs. The theater of military operations was quite mountainous, especially when the action took place in Korea and Eastern Manchuria. We didn’t have mountain cannons at all, and this, by the way, was a very big disadvantage, as practice has shown - i.e. The Japanese have mountain artillery, we don't. Howitzer artillery was bad on both sides: the Japanese had good artillery - Krupp guns, but there were quite a few of them. We had it and it was not very good, and there was very little of it - these were 6-inch Engelhardt mortars. Well, I reported the number of troops, right, everyone in the Russian Empire? So they had about 6 dozen of these mortars. Not rich, yes. They simply underestimated howitzer artillery and believed that field artillery could solve all problems. She could not solve all the problems. But in general, our field artillery, if on the plain, is stronger than ours, and quite clearly, if in the mountains, the Japanese are stronger, because it can operate there, but ours cannot. Now, this is what concerns artillery weapons. In addition, we had fortress and coastal artillery represented in the Japanese theater of war, i.e. in the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok we had a fairly large number of guns. For example, in Vladivostok there are 169 coastal guns, in Port Arthur, in my opinion, 118, or something, at the beginning of the war. At the same time, the guns were both the latest models and outdated. Outdated ones made up about 3/4. The same applied, in general, to fortress artillery. The Japanese in this regard were even worse, i.e., for example, part of their fortress siege artillery was represented by bronze mortars, already breech-loading, in short, approximately the same artillery that ours fought in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877. Not bad, yes. But the Japanese were lucky in that their fortress artillery never defended the fortress from us during the entire war, and the coastal artillery never fought off our ships. Those. In this case, their artillery was not tested for strength. Most likely, she would not have performed very well, but the fact is that she was not needed. Regarding the fleet: The Russian Empire had a much stronger fleet than the Japanese, but it was divided into 3 separate fleets. Those. we have the Baltic Fleet, we have the Black Sea Fleet and we have the Pacific Fleet. And the Japanese strike, in fact, was supposed to be taken by the Pacific Fleet. So he did not outnumber the Japanese. The Black Sea Fleet, due to the status of the straits, could not come to the rescue at all, and the Baltic Fleet had to be sent as the Second Pacific Squadron, and new ships for it were mostly still being built, and obsolete ones had just recently arrived from the Pacific Ocean and were undergoing modernization and repair current. What were the ships of the First Pacific Squadron like for us, i.e. who had to fight the Japanese, i.e. Pacific Fleet, strictly speaking? There we had 7 squadron battleships, of which 3 were somewhat outdated, but quite powerful battleships of the Petropavlovsk type, they had a displacement of about 11.5 thousand tons, the armor, let’s say, was still somewhat outdated from Harvey, armament: 4 305 mm guns and 12 152 mm guns, 8 of which are located in turrets, and the main caliber is all in turrets. The speed of these battleships was 15-16 knots. These are "Petropavlovsk", "Poltava", "Sevastopol". 2 newer battleships, so-called. battleship-cruisers such as "Peresvet" are "Peresvet" and "Pobeda". They have a speed of 18 knots, i.e. they “ran faster”, they have new, more modern armor, but the thickness of the armor itself has been reduced, i.e. 229 mm - 9 inches, and at the same time, in order to ensure good seaworthiness, long range and high speed for these ships, they decided to reduce the main caliber. Those. if the Petropavlovsk has 4 305 mm guns - the main caliber, then here there are 4 254 mm guns, i.e. from 12 to 10 inches they “sank”. To make it clear what this means, the weight of the projectile in the 12-inch was 331 kg, and in the 10-inch it was 250 kg. Significant difference, yes. Those. the ships suffered greatly in terms of firepower. And besides, due to the very high side, they had a lot of this unarmored side. Those. that on battleships, in general, the main armor is along the waterline and the artillery and conning tower are armored. And we had 2 battleships, built according to a new program, with weapons like the Petropavlovsk, in fact - 4 305 mm each and 12 152 mm each, but with a speed like the Peresvetov - 18 knots. This is the American-built Retvizan and the French-built Tsarevich. In due time, i.e. at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, these were some of the best ships in the world in their class. Those. with a displacement of 12.5 thousand tons, well, the “Tsesarevich” cost a little over 13 thousand, they were well armored, i.e. quite a large armor area, on the "Tsarevich" and the thickness of the armor is also 250 mm maximum, fully armored medium-caliber artillery, decent speed - i.e. really great ships. For their displacement they are simply beautiful. What is "Retvizan" in Russian? But the fact is that this name is not Russian, we inherited it from the Swedes. Those. at one time, our frigate captured the Swedish battleship "Retvizan" during one of the wars with the Swedes, also a sailing one, and introduced it into our fleet, we introduced it into our fleet. And he distinguished himself in combat, as a result the name began to be inherited. That's all. Does not translate? Yes, it translates somehow, I guess I just wasn’t even interested. So, "Retvizan" and "Tsarevich" were wonderful battleships, but there were 2 beautiful battleships. What did the Japanese have against our 7 battleships: they had 2 battleships “Fuji” and “Yashima”, which were built during the Sino-Japanese War; in terms of the armor scheme, in terms of placement of the armor, they are very close to our “Petropavlovsk” type battleships, i.e. .e. the armor is a little thicker, they themselves are 1000 tons larger, the weapons are even a little weaker: i.e. they have 4 305 mm and 10 152 mm guns. Plus, their artillery is poorly placed, i.e. their main caliber was placed in barbettes, covered with armored caps. Those. not normal towers like ours, but a barbette installation. And after each salvo to the side, it was necessary to return the turret to the center plane for loading, and then turn it again towards the enemy. This, with a rate of fire equal to ours, and generally equal to the theoretical rate of fire with other Japanese ones, the real rate of fire was reduced by 4-5 times. Original design, right? No, well, it saved weight, provided better protection, but you still had to pay for it, right? Well, it’s true, the advantages of these ships are that they had good seaworthiness, and most importantly, they developed speed: “Fuji” 18 knots, and “Yashima” 19 knots. Those. they “ran” faster than “Petropavlovsk” noticeably. And there were 4 battleships of the next generation, i.e. already with a different reservation system, with normal artillery installations, which are loaded in any position towards the horizon, i.e. there is no need to rotate the tower into the center plane. So these are 3 battleships almost identical in design - "Hatsuse", "Shikishima" and "Asahi", and one somewhat eye-catching, later one - the "Mikasa", which became the flagship. They simply took into account what was done in the previous battleship and slightly improved the reservation system and installed new artillery mounts. Those. if, for example, our battleships all had a maximum rate of fire of the order of 1 salvo per minute, the Japanese too, except for the Fuji and Yashima, which had less, then the Mikasa could fire 2 salvos per minute. Or rather, a little less, it has a reload time of 38 seconds. At the same time, the Japanese battleships, especially the new ones, also had more powerful anti-mine weapons, i.e. they had not 12, but 14 152 mm guns. The Japanese achieved this in a very simple way: their battleships were larger. If, for example, our “Retvizan” is 12.5 thousand tons, then “Mikasa” is 14.5 thousand tons. Well, all Japanese battleships were built in England. Cool! I just thought that they were developing technology there. No, they developed it there, they just managed to develop it to a sufficient level before the Russo-Japanese War. And we have 5 of our own battleships, one built in America and one in France. So this is where it was interesting: during this war, it was possible to compare 2 long-competing schools - French and English. And what did it show? Yes, it showed, in general, that the ships on both sides are worthy, i.e. fought against each other as equals. At the same time, our “Tsesarevich” was still smaller than the new Japanese battleships. The next class after battleships were armored cruisers. Here the picture was much worse for us. Those. We had 4 armored cruisers at the beginning of the war, the Japanese had 6. The Japanese had 6 ships of approximately the same type, i.e. These are Asama-class armored cruisers; there were few differences between them. The first two, the most similar ones, were built first for Chile during the arms race between Chile and Argentina. Since the countries reconciled, the Japanese bought out the Asamu and Tokiwa and ordered 2 more of the same ships, but with more advanced armor, not 2, but 3-tubes. Just like "Osama" and "Tokiwa" were built in England, and 2 were built, respectively, in France and Germany - "Azuma" and "Yakumo". They were slightly different in appearance, but all had approximately the same characteristics - i.e. speed 20-21 knots... Cheerful! Cheerful. The side armor is 178 mm, casemate turrets are 152 mm, and armament is 4 203 mm guns, 14 152 mm guns for English-built ships, and 4 x 203 and 12 x 152 mm for French and German-built ships. Those. the result was a fairly homogeneous formation of 6 armored cruisers, essentially almost of the same type. Our oldest was the armored cruiser "Rurik", which was created as a fighter for English trade, i.e. a huge, very seaworthy ship with very high autonomy, much larger than Japanese cruisers. In terms of displacement, by the way, it did not exceed them by much - by a couple of thousand tons, but in terms of visual dimensions it was much larger. Its speed was 18.5 knots, i.e. much less than the Japanese, and weapons: 4 203 mm guns, 16 - 152 mm and 6 120 mm guns. It would seem that this is a very powerful weapon, but the fact is that if the Japanese had 4 203 mm guns located on an armored cruiser - these are bow and stern 2-gun turrets, then on the same "Rurik" it is like on the Aurora - behind the shields guns that are located on the sides. Those. in the broadside I strongly welcome you! Boris Vitalievich, good time of year! Likewise. What did you get stuck on last time? Then we talked about the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, i.e. how our countries came to the point of declaring war. Well, now it probably makes sense to talk about what we fought with: the armed forces, weapons, and so on. Those. It would seem that you look at the globe, we really like to do history on the globe, and there is a huge Russian Empire, and tiny, tiny Japan. Well, strictly speaking, it is really tiny, it was much smaller in population than the Russian Empire, although not as it looks on the map: the Russian Empire had 170 million inhabitants at that moment, the Japanese Empire had 42 million inhabitants, as far as I remember. Somewhere in the mid-80s, I remember, I once got into an atlas - there were such good Soviet atlases - and was surprised to see that there were 117 million Russians and 117 million Japanese. This Japan is not visible near Russia, but we are about the same now. Now yes. There are more Russians than Japanese, but there are fewer Russians, perhaps even smaller. Those. There are now more than 120 million Japanese. Well, even 40 is still good, i.e. this is a decent power. Quite, which at that time was developing quite rapidly. Those. After the Meiji Revolution there, Japan actually grew very significantly every year. Strictly speaking, like the Soviet Union under Stalin - somewhere like that, the pace of development was the same. But it’s true that the Japanese had a very low start, i.e. from deep feudalism decisively to capitalism. By this time they had already won the Sino-Japanese War, received a colossal indemnity, received warships and, in fact, received international recognition as almost white people who have the right to own colonies and not be a colony. Those. made their way into a number of leading world powers. Well, of course, the forces, taken as a whole, of Russia and Japan were poorly comparable, after all, Russia was much larger, had a larger economy and had a more than 4-fold superiority in population. Those. there was a definite advantage. But our war was not between Russia and Japan, let’s say that Japan is trying to capture Russia or Russia is trying to capture Japan. Colonial war - i.e. who will rob the Chinese. And here Japan is nearby, Russia is generally far away, i.e. The main resources of the Russian Empire are located to the west of the Urals, and then to the east of the Urals, God knows how long it will take to get to China, to Manchuria. So this is what the Russian army was like. Sorry, I’ll interrupt you: in those days the BAM had already been laid there, no? No, they built the Trans-Siberian Railway. Was there a railway? Yes, but it was a single track, i.e. on light ballast, with light rails, i.e. limited train capacity, limited speed - no more than 30 versts per hour. And so, in fact, by the beginning of the Russian-Japanese War, the Trans-Siberian Railway had a capacity of 6 pairs of trains per day. Not rich. Well, the trains then had a much smaller carrying capacity than now - the trains were shorter, the locomotives were weaker. Well, accordingly, if by ship, then it is from the Baltic or from the Black Sea, or through Suez... Through 3 oceans. Or around Africa, who the hell. Far. Yes. Therefore, it turns out that the theater was largely isolated. True, there were also... there was a certain Russian population, and there were Cossack troops stationed right along the border with China, i.e. there were certain human resources. But, of course, they cannot be compared with the Japanese 40 million. And so, in principle, our entire theater of military operations “hung” either at sea and a single-track railway, or simply on a “single-track” if the Japanese dominate the sea. But this is exactly the situation from a logistics point of view. And now: what were the armed forces like? The Russian Empire had the largest peacetime army at that time, i.e. the army itself was about 1 million 100 thousand people, and all the armed forces were about 1 million 350 thousand people. For comparison: the Japanese army numbered 160 thousand people in peacetime. Incomparable, yes. The system, the organization of the armed forces was quite similar: we had all-class conscription, not universal - our economy was a little lacking for universal conscription. At the same time, they served in military service for 4 years, then they were in the reserves, then they were assigned to the militia. So, those who were not called up for military service were immediately enlisted in the militia warriors. Those. This is how, in theory, the service should have been built. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, we had about 2 million trained reserves for the army that we have. The Japanese have a peacetime army of 160 thousand people, according to the report of Kuropatkin, who carefully studied Japan and was considered, by the way, one of the brilliant strategists at that time, well, before the Russo-Japanese War, before the start, and so he assessed the mobilization abilities of the Japanese army taking into account and reservists and territorial troops, like 375 thousand people. The picture in fact was somewhat different: the Japanese took over the Prussian system, i.e. they have 3 years of military service, 4 years 4 months in reserve, and then they are transferred to the reserve. They also had all-class conscription, because they also did not require universal conscription, and they managed to mobilize 600 thousand people at the beginning of the war. Not bad! They had a country divided into 12 divisional districts, and, in fact, they created an army of 13 divisions - 12 infantry divisions and 1 guards, capital. And in each division a reserve brigade was created from artillerymen. Those. here are 13 divisions - 13 brigades, not counting cavalry units. These are the main parts. Next, here is what they had in reserve and in the militia, from which additional units were recruited for the territorial troops and... reserve divisions. That is, the Japanese managed, let’s say, to put more under arms than they had planned according to the standard mobilization scheme. And here we get a picture: we have 1 million 350 thousand, the Japanese have 160 thousand, but in the Far East we have 98 thousand people - these are in the troops and 24 thousand border guards, also, in principle, sometimes participated in battles, but they were subordinate to the Ministry of Finance. So, the Japanese have a clear superiority. Everything else we have is what we can deliver by rail and what we can supply via it. The Japanese army was well prepared, i.e. until 1901, not even - until 1902 it was prepared by German specialists, since 1902 it was prepared by English specialists, taking into account the experience of the Boer War. Our army was preparing, strictly speaking, according to its own best practices and, in principle, they were a little outdated by the time. For example, the Japanese mastered such a thing as digging in on the battlefield, but for us this was not a serious discipline. They practiced actions in loose formation, i.e., for example, if the Japanese have a 3-battalion regiment, then it has 6 companies deployed in rifle chains, 2 companies in platoon columns, so to speak, providing support, and 1 battalion in reserve. In our country, if a regiment is deployed, then we had a rather stupid binary system, or rather, a quaternary system - this is... in short, we have 4 regiments in a division, 4 battalions in a regiment, and 4 companies in a battalion. Those. Our regiment has 16 companies. So, 2 companies of them were deployed into rifle chains. Another 2 companies in platoon support, i.e. 4 companies are the first line. 4 companies are our second line in company columns, i.e. in fact, the reserve of those deployed units, and 2 battalions in reserve. Is this due to lack of war experience or was it somehow like that then? We played it safe, i.e. they overestimated the role of reserves and because of this underestimated the role of those troops that directly wage battle. During the war, this practice began to be revised, i.e. They began to withdraw from a regiment, for example, not 2 battalions, but only 1, to the reserve, and deploy 3 battalions into battle formations. Well, because otherwise it would not have been possible to fight properly at all - no matter what forces there were, there was still little fighting. We had much better cavalry in quality and much greater numbers than the Japanese. Those. better horse composition, better dressage. But the cavalry didn’t really “light up” in this war. The Japanese cavalry was smaller in number, but it was essentially riding infantry, i.e. she was not noticed in dashing cavalry attacks; in any combat clash she immediately dismounted, lay down and fired back from her rifles. Did the horses lie down too? They were driven to the rear. And so, if there had been a horse cabin, of course, our cavalry would have been much stronger. But there were no horse fellings in this war. Those. The Japanese placed their main emphasis on infantry. Of the advantages of our infantry over the Japanese, there was a clear advantage - we had a high culture of marching, i.e. You remember army drill, right? Ability to march in step. For example, a company is going somewhere cheerfully. The Japanese did not have time for this, so the troops marched almost in a crowd, i.e. a long, stretched column without formation, out of step, nothing. Because of this, their division's marching speed was 1.5-2 times lower than ours. How lovely! This, by the way, affected the speed of Japanese manners during the war. Yes. There is a well-known joke about: if you are so smart, why don’t you march in formation - it is, in general, not a joke. Well, yes, that is. The Japanese did not march in formation, by the way, based on the experience of the Russian-Japanese War, they took this very seriously, and by the next war with China they seriously trained their troops in this regard - they began to move much more vigorously. On the topic of the armament of this very infantry: our main infantry armament was the Mosin rifle: a repeating rifle made in 1891, it was subsequently improved, i.e., in principle, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War we had several modifications in service, but all they were called exactly the same. And this rifle, we often write that it was the best in the world. They usually forget to add: it was the best in the world in the year of its creation - in 1891. No, it really was the best in the world, at that time the Lebel repeating rifle, for example, which was the most common, was inferior in most respects to our Mosin rifle. There is a Gra rifle and others - they were worse. The same Japanese Murata rifle is old, it was also worse. But later newer rifles were created. What about Arisaka? "Arisaka" was newer, it was created with an eye on the German Mauser rifle of 1898. In principle, what were the differences between “Mosinka” and “Arisaka” - “Mosinka” we have a 3-line, i.e. caliber 7.62 mm. Japanese rifle 6.5 mm, i.e. caliber is smaller. "Arisaka" is a little lighter than the "mosinka", has a higher initial speed, better ballistics at close and medium distances, well, due to the higher initial speed. At long distances, the “mosinka” hits somewhat better due to the banally heavier bullet. It has a better effect on the enemy’s body, again, due to a heavier bullet. Has greater recoil due to the larger caliber. The Arisaka rifle has a special shield, for example, on the bolt, which protects the mechanism from dust and dirt. The Mosinka does not have such charms, but the mechanism is made so, let’s say, intelligently from the point of view of use in combat that the reliability is still high. Those. The Mosin rifle had very little fear of contamination. But due to the fact that our rifle is older, there are several archaic shortcomings: a less comfortable stock stock, a bolt handle pushed forward, i.e. with the Arisaka it is nearby, with the Mosinka it is further away, which makes it more difficult... not that it makes it more difficult - it throws off the aim more when reloading. We have a protruding magazine, while the Japanese have it recessed into the stock of the butt, i.e. it cannot be damaged by, say, an accidental blow. But all these moments, in fact, relate to taste, i.e. weapons can be considered virtually equivalent. Those. a company armed with Mosin rifles will be no worse in a firefight than a company armed with Arisaka rifles, or practically no worse. And the shootout in this case will be quite equivalent. Our militia units, which, for example, later fought on Sakhalin, were armed with a Berdan rifle, this is our previous one. It is single-shot, it was great in its time, but in the Russo-Japanese War it was completely outdated. The Japanese, just like us, only have enough Arisaka rifles for combat units and reservists. Those. their Landwehr, such a militia, was also armed with outdated rifles, i.e. then their reserve divisions fought with them. These are Murata rifles. Murat's rifle is worse than the Arisaka or Mosinka, but it is noticeably better than the Berdanka. But this, I say again, is part of, one might say, the second line. This is what concerns small arms. You can also remember machine guns, in fact. At the beginning of the war, there were no machine guns, practically none, neither we nor the Japanese, in the combat zone. Let's say we had 8 machine guns in the Manchurian army - that's nothing. The Japanese also began hostilities, in general, without machine guns. During the war, the number of machine guns increased greatly. Our main machine gun was the Maxim machine gun, which was produced under license from the Vickers company. It has colossal firepower, i.e. It can fire continuously, it is water-cooled, but we had it located on a fairly, and not just enough, but on a terribly bulky carriage, similar to a gun carriage - with high wheels, with a large shield. This is good against the Papuans, but against a well-armed enemy army it is not very good... Not great, right? The Japanese used, moreover, from a tripod, usually a Hotchkiss machine gun of either the 1897 or 1900 model. By the way, the Japanese have established its production. This is a rather interesting design, which not everyone will immediately recognize as a machine gun. For example, they used the so-called. rigid tape, i.e. He only shot truly reliably using a rigid tape. What it is? And this is a frame for 2.5 dozen rounds of ammunition, which you insert into the side, shoot, insert the next one, shoot. Those. This machine gun, due to such loading, and also because it was air-cooled, could not fire... provide such a barrage of fire as the Maxim machine gun. But it was much lighter, more compact, and, sadly, the Japanese had much more of them. Those. for example, in the battle of Mukden we had 56 machine guns, and the Japanese had 200. Wow! In addition to the Vickers machine gun, but, by the way, the Vickers, in addition to its large dimensions and very heavy weight, the Vickers/Maxim, which we had in service, had another very big drawback: the fact is that ours were bought a license in 1897 for the production of this machine gun, according to which the Vickers company received 50 feet sterling for each machine gun produced in our country for 10 years - this is approximately 500 rubles in gold. Not bad! For every. Vickers stood strong. Very. Those. right here, given that the production of machine guns was constantly increasing, i.e. At first we were aiming to produce a small amount, but here we got a very solid amount of money. Jumping to the side: what kind of machine gun did the Red Army soldier Sukhov have? He had a "Lewis" - this is a light machine gun of the First World War, this is a much later machine. So, let's continue. But, by the way, we also had a machine gun similar to this one. Well, that is. how - not similar in appearance, but similar in method of use. We purchased a Madsen submachine gun for fortresses, such as the Privetninsky fortresses and the fortresses of the Far East. Those. It would seem that this is exactly what the troops need, but it was purchased for fortresses. In fact, this is precisely a light machine gun, i.e. it has a casing, a bipod, and a magazine on top - a classic of the genre. Here, in fact, there were two such machine guns - “Vikkres” / “Maxim” and this “Madsen”, Danish. A good machine gun, but with all the disadvantages of a light machine gun - i.e. You cannot provide such a flurry of fire from it as from an easel one, and such accuracy of fire. This is a small weapon. Those. it can be considered, in principle, equivalent. Regarding artillery: our main cannon was a cannon from the Obukhov plant, model 1902. The Japanese have a 75-mm Arisaka cannon. The caliber is almost the same - 75 mm and 76.2 mm. But our gun belonged to what is called a “quick-firing gun,” i.e. rollback along the axis of the bore, quick-release bolt. Those. our gun provided a rate of fire quite easily up to 15 rounds per minute. Solid! The Japanese cannon was more compact than ours, but the entire carriage failed, i.e. It had no recoil devices at all. Access to the shutter is quite inconvenient and separate charging, i.e. rate of fire 4-5 rounds per minute. Plus, our gun had a superior rate of fire, i.e. our gun hit 10 versts, the Japanese one - 7. Our cannon could shoot shrapnel at 6-7 versts, the Japanese - 4.5. Those. here our cannon surpassed the Japanese one in firepower, one might say, many times over, so the artillery can be considered much more advanced, for example, the field artillery. But the Japanese had a third of their artillery - these were mountain cannons, i.e. the same Arisaka guns, slightly lighter, which were disassembled and could be dragged on packs. The theater of military operations was quite mountainous, especially when the action took place in Korea and Eastern Manchuria. We didn’t have mountain cannons at all, and this, by the way, was a very big disadvantage, as practice has shown - i.e. The Japanese have mountain artillery, we don't. Howitzer artillery was bad on both sides: the Japanese had good artillery - Krupp guns, but there were quite a few of them. We had it and it was not very good, and there was very little of it - these were 6-inch Engelhardt mortars. Well, I reported the number of troops, right, everyone in the Russian Empire? So they had about 6 dozen of these mortars. Not rich, yes. They simply underestimated howitzer artillery and believed that field artillery could solve all problems. She could not solve all the problems. But in general, our field artillery, if on the plain, is stronger than ours, and quite clearly, if in the mountains, the Japanese are stronger, because it can operate there, but ours cannot. Now, this is what concerns artillery weapons. In addition, we had fortress and coastal artillery represented in the Japanese theater of war, i.e. in the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok we had a fairly large number of guns. For example, in Vladivostok there are 169 coastal guns, in Port Arthur, in my opinion, 118, or something, at the beginning of the war. At the same time, the guns were both the latest models and outdated. Outdated ones made up about 3/4. The same applied, in general, to fortress artillery. The Japanese in this regard were even worse, i.e., for example, part of their fortress siege artillery was represented by bronze mortars, already breech-loading, in short, approximately the same artillery that ours fought in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877. Not bad, yes. But the Japanese were lucky in that their fortress artillery never defended the fortress from us during the entire war, and the coastal artillery never fought off our ships. Those. In this case, their artillery was not tested for strength. Most likely, she would not have performed very well, but the fact is that she was not needed. Regarding the fleet: The Russian Empire had a much stronger fleet than the Japanese, but it was divided into 3 separate fleets. Those. we have the Baltic Fleet, we have the Black Sea Fleet and we have the Pacific Fleet. And the Japanese strike, in fact, was supposed to be taken by the Pacific Fleet. So he did not outnumber the Japanese. The Black Sea Fleet, due to the status of the straits, could not come to the rescue at all, and the Baltic Fleet had to be sent as the Second Pacific Squadron, and new ships for it were mostly still being built, and obsolete ones had just recently arrived from the Pacific Ocean and were undergoing modernization and repair current. What were the ships of the First Pacific Squadron like for us, i.e. who had to fight the Japanese, i.e. Pacific Fleet, strictly speaking? There we had 7 squadron battleships, of which 3 were somewhat outdated, but quite powerful battleships of the Petropavlovsk type, they had a displacement of about 11.5 thousand tons, the armor, let’s say, was still somewhat outdated from Harvey, armament: 4 305 mm guns and 12 152 mm guns, 8 of which are located in turrets, and the main caliber is all in turrets. The speed of these battleships was 15-16 knots. These are "Petropavlovsk", "Poltava", "Sevastopol". 2 newer battleships, so-called. battleship-cruisers such as "Peresvet" are "Peresvet" and "Pobeda". They have a speed of 18 knots, i.e. they “ran faster”, they have new, more modern armor, but the thickness of the armor itself has been reduced, i.e. 229 mm - 9 inches, and at the same time, in order to ensure good seaworthiness, long range and high speed for these ships, they decided to reduce the main caliber. Those. if the Petropavlovsk has 4 305 mm guns - the main caliber, then here there are 4 254 mm guns, i.e. from 12 to 10 inches they “sank”. To make it clear what this means, the weight of the projectile in the 12-inch was 331 kg, and in the 10-inch it was 250 kg. Significant difference, yes. Those. the ships suffered greatly in terms of firepower. And besides, due to the very high side, they had a lot of this unarmored side. Those. that on battleships, in general, the main armor is along the waterline and the artillery and conning tower are armored. And we had 2 battleships, built according to a new program, with weapons like the Petropavlovsk, in fact - 4 305 mm each and 12 152 mm each, but with a speed like the Peresvetov - 18 knots. This is the American-built Retvizan and the French-built Tsarevich. In due time, i.e. at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, these were some of the best ships in the world in their class. Those. with a displacement of 12.5 thousand tons, well, the “Tsesarevich” cost a little over 13 thousand, they were well armored, i.e. quite a large armor area, on the "Tsarevich" and the thickness of the armor is also 250 mm maximum, fully armored medium-caliber artillery, decent speed - i.e. really great ships. For their displacement they are simply beautiful. What is "Retvizan" in Russian? But the fact is that this name is not Russian, we inherited it from the Swedes. Those. at one time, our frigate captured the Swedish battleship "Retvizan" during one of the wars with the Swedes, also a sailing one, and introduced it into our fleet, we introduced it into our fleet. And he distinguished himself in combat, as a result the name began to be inherited. That's all. Does not translate? Yes, it translates somehow, I guess I just wasn’t even interested. So, "Retvizan" and "Tsarevich" were wonderful battleships, but there were 2 beautiful battleships. What did the Japanese have against our 7 battleships: they had 2 battleships “Fuji” and “Yashima”, which were built during the Sino-Japanese War; in terms of the armor scheme, in terms of placement of the armor, they are very close to our “Petropavlovsk” type battleships, i.e. .e. the armor is a little thicker, they themselves are 1000 tons larger, the weapons are even a little weaker: i.e. they have 4 305 mm and 10 152 mm guns. Plus, their artillery is poorly placed, i.e. their main caliber was placed in barbettes, covered with armored caps. Those. not normal towers like ours, but a barbette installation. And after each salvo to the side, it was necessary to return the turret to the center plane for loading, and then turn it again towards the enemy. This, with a rate of fire equal to ours, and generally equal to the theoretical rate of fire with other Japanese ones, the real rate of fire was reduced by 4-5 times. Original design, right? No, well, it saved weight, provided better protection, but you still had to pay for it, right? Well, it’s true, the advantages of these ships are that they had good seaworthiness, and most importantly, they developed speed: “Fuji” 18 knots, and “Yashima” 19 knots. Those. they “ran” faster than “Petropavlovsk” noticeably. And there were 4 battleships of the next generation, i.e. already with a different reservation system, with normal artillery installations, which are loaded in any position towards the horizon, i.e. there is no need to rotate the tower into the center plane. So these are 3 battleships almost identical in design - "Hatsuse", "Shikishima" and "Asahi", and one somewhat eye-catching, later one - the "Mikasa", which became the flagship. They simply took into account what was done in the previous battleship and slightly improved the reservation system and installed new artillery mounts. Those. if, for example, our battleships all had a maximum rate of fire of the order of 1 salvo per minute, the Japanese too, except for the Fuji and Yashima, which had less, then the Mikasa could fire 2 salvos per minute. Or rather, a little less, it has a reload time of 38 seconds. At the same time, the Japanese battleships, especially the new ones, also had more powerful anti-mine weapons, i.e. they had not 12, but 14 152 mm guns. The Japanese achieved this in a very simple way: their battleships were larger. If, for example, our “Retvizan” is 12.5 thousand tons, then “Mikasa” is 14.5 thousand tons. Well, all Japanese battleships were built in England. Cool! I just thought that they were developing technology there. No, they developed it there, they just managed to develop it to a sufficient level before the Russo-Japanese War. And we have 5 of our own battleships, one built in America and one in France. So this is where it was interesting: during this war, it was possible to compare 2 long-competing schools - French and English. And what did it show? Yes, it showed, in general, that the ships on both sides are worthy, i.e. fought against each other as equals. At the same time, our “Tsesarevich” was still smaller than the new Japanese battleships. The next class after battleships were armored cruisers. Here the picture was much worse for us. Those. We had 4 armored cruisers at the beginning of the war, the Japanese had 6. The Japanese had 6 ships of approximately the same type, i.e. These are Asama-class armored cruisers; there were few differences between them. The first two, the most similar ones, were built first for Chile during the arms race between Chile and Argentina. Since the countries reconciled, the Japanese bought out the Asamu and Tokiwa and ordered 2 more of the same ships, but with more advanced armor, not 2, but 3-tubes. Just like "Osama" and "Tokiwa" were built in England, and 2 were built, respectively, in France and Germany - "Azuma" and "Yakumo". They were slightly different in appearance, but all had approximately the same characteristics - i.e. speed 20-21 knots... Cheerful! Cheerful. The side armor is 178 mm, casemate turrets are 152 mm, and armament is 4 203 mm guns, 14 152 mm guns for English-built ships, and 4 x 203 and 12 x 152 mm for French and German-built ships. Those. the result was a fairly homogeneous formation of 6 armored cruisers, essentially almost of the same type. Our oldest was the armored cruiser "Rurik", which was created as a fighter for English trade, i.e. a huge, very seaworthy ship with very high autonomy, much larger than Japanese cruisers. In terms of displacement, by the way, it did not exceed them by much - by a couple of thousand tons, but in terms of visual dimensions it was much larger. Its speed was 18.5 knots, i.e. much less than the Japanese, and weapons: 4 203 mm guns, 16 - 152 mm and 6 120 mm guns. It would seem that this is a very powerful weapon, but the fact is that if the Japanese had 4 203 mm guns located on an armored cruiser - these are bow and stern 2-gun turrets, then on the same "Rurik" it is like on the Aurora - behind the shields guns that are located on the sides. Those. in a broadside salvo the Japanese have 4 203 mm guns, we have 2. Our next newer cruiser - "Russia" - already developed a speed of 19 knots, and even a half, and had approximately the same armament - i.e. 4 x 203 mm and 16 x 152 mm. But again, there were no towers, i.e. the artillery was located in casemates and behind shields. The last of this series is the cruiser "Gromoboy" - the same weapons as the "Russia", the speed has increased to 20 knots. Newer, thinner, but larger armor, but at the same time, again, artillery in casemates, i.e. there are no towers. Accordingly, all of our cruisers were doomed to receive a broadside salvo of 2 203 mm weapons with 4 guns. These ships were all ocean hunters, they were healthy. Those. Let's say, if "Osama", for example, has a displacement of 9.5 thousand tons, or rather 9800, then "Thunderbolt" - it has 12.5 thousand tons, it is like a battleship in size. Those. We have huge high-speed ocean raiders, while the Japanese produce smaller, more compact and more nimble battleships. Those. Japanese ships are stronger in artillery combat. In communications, of course, the picture is different there - i.e. there, seaworthiness and cruising range come to one of the first places, then our cruisers were beyond competition. And we had one new generation cruiser - the cruiser Bayan, built in France - a good name, by the way. So it was smaller than the Japanese and than our other cruisers, had a speed of 21 knots, had 203 mm armor, i.e. It was well armored, but it had only 2 guns - 203 mm and 8 152 mm. True, this time the 203 mm guns were in single-gun armored turrets, i.e. They were well placed, but in terms of the weight of the salvo, it was almost 2 times inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers. And besides, he, of course, was quite perfect, but he was alone. And if we had 7 battleships in Port Arthur and with them the armored cruiser "Bayan", then the armored cruisers "Rurik", "Russia" and "Gromoboy" were in Vladivostok, i.e. were based separately because they were not intended to operate together with the squadron in the same formation. Well, because of its large size and not very good placement of artillery. Then the picture becomes even more interesting: armored cruisers. We had 7 armored cruisers in the Pacific Ocean, of which 5 were 1st rank and 2 were 2nd rank. Well, what was the difference, strictly speaking - our 1st rank cruisers had 6-inch guns, i.e. 152 mm. Our most famous 1st rank cruiser of that time was the Aurora. By the way, there were 2 cruisers of the same type with her - "Diana" and "Pallada", i.e. from the same series. And rank 2 cruisers had a caliber of 120 mm, i.e. this is a 2 times lighter projectile. What was this selection like? "Diana" and "Pallada", even our sailors mocked them to some extent, i.e. They called them, firstly, “Dashka” and “Palashka”, and secondly, the officers laughed that the Diana-class cruisers differed from the usual transatlantic packet boat by a certain number of 6-inch guns and relative slowness. Those. These cruisers had a speed of 19 knots, were armed with 8 152 mm guns, and were healthy. Well, just a comparison, last time I even mentioned it, right? If we compare "Varyag" and "Aurora", 19 knots for "Aurora", 23 knots for "Varyag"; 8 152 mm guns for the Aurora, 12 152 mm guns for the Varyag; The Aurora has a cruising range of 3,700 miles, and the Varyag has a cruising range of 6,000 miles. At the same time, the displacement of the Aurora is slightly greater than that of the Varyag. And they are the same age in construction. Cool. Well, this is how much our shipbuilding has suffered purely due to the lag in technology. So, our 2 cruisers of 1st rank were not very good. The other 3 were great, i.e. they were built according to a new program, 12 152 mm guns, all developed a speed of 23-24 knots, all were fairly well protected, with a long cruising range, i.e. excellent ships. One was built in Germany by Krupp - this is Askold. By the way, it stood out very characteristically - it has a 5-pipe. One was built by Kramp's company - the 4-pipe "Varyag". And the best of them was the cruiser "Bogatyr", built by the German company "Schihau", it had a 3-pipe. He even had some of his artillery located in armored casemates, and some in armored towers, i.e. no match for both the Aurora and the Varyag. So, we have 5 ships of 1st rank. In rank 2 we had 2 ships. One of them is the cruiser Novik, which had rather weak armor, like, in general, all cruisers of the 2nd rank, rather weak weapons - 6 120 mm guns, but it was the fastest cruiser in the world at that time - it developed a speed of 25 knots. Wow! And was supposed to serve as a squadron reconnaissance aircraft. Those. the ship was, I would say, excellent for its tasks. Well, the fastest cruiser in the world is the fastest cruiser in the world. The second one we built was purely based on dynastic connections - the cruiser "Boyarin". It is slightly larger than the Novik, also with 6 120 mm guns, and was created for the same tasks, but the speed was 22 knots. It was built by such famous shipbuilders as the Danes, i.e. In general, I haven’t seriously heard about Danish ships for export, but the Russian Empire simply decided to help Denmark, the Kingdom of Denmark due to the fact that the queen, or rather, the empress-mother, is Danish, a Danish princess. Were the ships expensive? At that time, a squadron type "Petropavlovsk" battleship cost about 10 million rubles. The cruiser "Varyag" cost 6 million rubles. A destroyer at that time cost from 300 to 500 thousand rubles. Those. That's where the prices are. Expensive. Expensive. And if you consider that the ammunition of this ship costs as much as a third of the ship, plus the operation is expensive. Expensive entertainment is war. Not cheap. Well, let’s say the cruiser “Rurik” cost us, in my opinion, 10 million rubles, which is a large armored vessel. The Japanese had as many as 12 armored cruisers. In truth, they did not have a single 1st rank cruiser, i.e. All their armored cruisers were small. Or rather, one of them was even armored, but it was the smallest Japanese cruiser. But he had an armor belt. That's where his merits ended. Often they had quite old ships, but they carefully modernized them all, replacing artillery with new ones. Their old one was "Izumi", which was built for Chile back in 1883, i.e. older than our "Rurik", then "Naniva" and "Takachiho" were also built a long time ago, but they were rearmed. "Chiodo" was re-equipped, the boilers of the vehicles were changed, i.e. all the “stuffing” was changed in the ship. The best of the Japanese was the cruiser "Yoshina", built in England, which took part in the Sino-Japanese War, but at the same time had a speed of 23 knots. Those. it has 4 152 mm guns and 8 120 mm guns. And then the Japanese again built the cruiser Tokosaga in England. They practically built all the cruisers according to... designs, in fact, by Armstrong’s company in England: i.e. the ships were small, compact, but “ran” very quickly, with very powerful weapons. True, they had to pay for this in terms of habitability, seaworthiness, and cruising range, but precisely as artillery platforms, they were quite vigorous. And here is the cruiser "Tokosaga", which was the best armored cruiser of the Japanese fleet at the beginning of the war, it has a displacement of 4200 tons, i.e. it is 1.5 times smaller in displacement than the Varyag, and its armament is 2 203 mm guns, i.e. as on armored cruisers, and 10 120 mm guns. Quite a thick armored deck with thick bevels and a speed of 23 knots. And they had approximately the same characteristics, but were a little larger - these were the cruisers "Chitose" and "Kasagi" built in America according to the same technical specifications at the same, by the way, Kramp company where Varyag was built. there were more cruisers, but they were smaller, and they didn’t have such ships as our best armored cruisers such as “Askold”, “Varyag”, “Bogatyr”, i.e. here our qualitative superiority was absolute, because we have a whole class of ships, but the Japanese don’t have it. Next we have... And the ships, please tell me, for dummies, what are ships for? To sink each other, or for that to hit the shore? It depends on the class. The point is that first you need to figure out what the fleet is for. The fleet serves to seize dominance at sea and use this dominance for your own purposes. Well, let’s say you had us Crimean War After our fleet was sunk in Sevastopol, the British and French came wherever they wanted, fired at whatever they wanted, landed troops wherever they wanted. Right? And we had to defend the coast, build coastal fortifications everywhere, and try to somehow fight back. Plus, they conduct their own maritime trade, but we do not. Those. the fleet provides enormous advantages to the country that has a stronger fleet, from which the fleet seizes supremacy at sea. And here’s what specific classes of ships do: battleships are needed primarily to destroy any classes of enemy ships in an artillery battle, so they have thick armor, very powerful artillery, but they are the most expensive, the largest, and there are not so many of them. Cruisers are multi-purpose ships, i.e. they must also destroy all classes of ships, except for battleships; a cruiser usually cannot compete with a battleship in an artillery battle, plus they must conduct reconnaissance within the squadron, long-range reconnaissance, carry out raids on enemy shores, enter communications and sink enemy transports , protect your communications. Those. This is a multi-purpose ship. Typically, cruisers run a little faster than battleships, are much worse, but still powerfully protected, and much worse, but still powerfully armed, and usually have somewhat greater autonomy. The next class is destroyers. And, by the way, cruisers, due to the fact that there is specialization for different tasks, for which there is more, they are just armored cruisers and cruisers of 1st rank - they are in order to “wet” the enemy more, therefore they are the largest and strongest , but they can also solve other tasks, ranks 2 and 3 - they are just for “running” as scouts, chasing enemy destroyers - for such tasks. That's why they are smaller, weaker and cheaper. Next are destroyers and torpedo boats. Strictly speaking, a destroyer is a destroyer, just larger. These are ships named after their main armament - after the torpedo, i.e. self-propelled mine. I kept thinking - what the hell is this? So, they were distinguished by their small silhouette, making it more difficult to hit, high speed - well, as far as it turned out, practically complete absence of armor, low seaworthiness, and low autonomy. Destroyers could still operate on the open sea, but small destroyers were strictly for coastal operations. That's why it's called a squadron - it can accompany a squadron at sea. So, their main weapons are torpedoes. Those. a destroyer, let's say, our standard one... had torpedoes and a couple of small rapid-fire guns, and a speed of about 20-24 knots. And our destroyers no longer had a displacement of 100-150 tons, like destroyers, but from 250 to 350 tons and a speed of 24-26 knots, and were armed with one 75 mm cannon, 3-5 small-caliber guns and usually had 2-3 torpedoes apparatus, moreover, heavier ones with larger-caliber torpedoes. Those. is already quite a serious threat to enemy ships. We had 24 destroyers at the beginning of the war, the Japanese had 19. We had 10 destroyers, the Japanese had 3 dozen, i.e. quite a bit of. Well, then there are minelayers, auxiliary cruisers, and so on - this, in principle, no longer affects the power of the fleets. Those. that is why destroyers, destroyers, cruisers and battleships at that time were classified as so-called. main classes, the balance of forces was measured by them. And here we get a picture: that we had approximately equality with the Japanese in terms of armored forces, well, that is. The Japanese have more armored ships, but mainly due to armored cruisers, and there are 1 fewer squadron battleships. The Japanese already have a fairly noticeable numerical superiority in armored cruisers, and in light forces and mine forces they already have an almost double superiority. Considering that Japan is located next to our fortresses in the Far East, the superiority in light forces was quite unpleasant. But something else was much more unpleasant here: Most of our forces were in Port Arthur, in the Yellow Sea, and a smaller part in Vladivostok, in the Sea of ​​Japan. And between them was Korea, which acted as such a huge cape between these two bases, i.e. Our naval forces were practically unable to interact. The Japanese had their main base directly opposite the southern tip of Korea - Shimonoseki. Or rather, two bases - Shimonoseki and Sasebo, the main one was Sasebo, but they were nearby, and both were located opposite the southern tip of Korea, i.e. It was convenient for them to act against both Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and there was absolutely no need for them to divide their forces. This is what concerns the balance of forces at sea. Well, since we didn’t fight in Japan, we don’t need to mention Japanese fortresses, but we had 2 first-class fortresses in the Far East. First-class is not a figurative and beautiful name, but these are simply 1st class fortresses, officially, that’s what they were called. These are Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Vladivostok was already completely completed, Port Arthur seemed to be in a fairly high degree of readiness, but in terms of the main new fortifications - forts and external fortifications - it was quite poorly prepared. Those. Kuropatkin reported in 1903 that the fortress was completely ready and could repel any assault, but at the moment when he reported, out of 6 forts, 1 of us was completely ready and 2 were partially ready, and of the 5 long-term fortifications, which are a little under-fortified, completely ready 0, partially ready 2. For example, fort No. 6 at that time was not even marked on the ground, it was simply known on the map where it would stand. Those. this is the moment. And for example, at the beginning of hostilities in Port Arthur, there were 8 guns out of the required almost 400 on the land front. Vladivostok was much more well prepared in this regard, but also not 100%. But there were fortresses, the fortresses were quite powerful, and then the Japanese had to tinker with Port Arthur. This, in fact, is how the parties approached the war. Somehow we weren’t very active in robbing the Chinese - we couldn’t build a normal fortress. What it is? No, they could have staged it, but the picture is like this - here there is this stadium "Zenith... ...Arena". Does technology not allow you to build? Billion upon billion, yes. It’s the same thing in Port Arthur - they steal. Those. According to the reports, everything is fine - not in place. I immediately remember: in Havana, Cuba, there was some kind of super-duper Spanish fortress there that cost so much money that when King Philip of Spain was told what time it rose, he shouted: “Give me a telescope - for such money it should be visible from here.” !" It was much the same with Port Arthur, moreover, the theft there was amazing in some respects - there, for example, cement was constantly stolen, because of this there was little cement in the solution, there was a lot of sand, i.e. moments were noted that you could break off the corner of the concrete casemate with your hands. Those. that was enough. Theft was not only during the construction of the fortress, theft was, in principle, everywhere. In addition, there was a strange assessment of how one should approach preparations for war. For example, Kuropatkin noted that the Japanese are poorly prepared because they are unspiritual, i.e. they learn to love their homeland, the emperor and fight, but we also need to have ... highly spiritual support, and therefore, with money from the military department, which, in general, we always had back to back, we slowed down both the construction of fortresses and the construction roads, and the construction of ships, lack of financial constant. Here Kuropatkin built 52 churches with money from the military department, not with money from the Synod. Well done! Well, we must. Those. It is quite obvious that they were all Orthodox, they were all honest people, everything was as it should be. Yes, well, Kuropatkin took this very seriously. And the last point I would like to note is about explosives and shells. The fact is that there are many interesting myths that the Japanese had a wonderful shimosa. So, shimosa is just a Japanese version of liddite - it is picric acid, i.e. one of the variants of highly explosive explosives. It is not so different from the wet pyroxylin used in the Russian army and navy, which is also a highly explosive explosive. In this respect, our situation was no worse than that of the Japanese, in some ways even better; the Japanese used black powder ammunition more often than we did. Those. We had enough pyroxin, it seemed, for everything. And the second point, this is then serious, so to speak, in our country it was almost declared by many to be the reason for defeat in the war - we had lighter shells than the Japanese. i.e., let’s say, a 12-inch shell on a Japanese battleship weighed 380 kg. Solid! And ours weighed 330 kg. In fact, what this was connected with was precisely what Admiral Makarov did at one time when he was the head of the Fleet Artillery Directorate. He proceeded from a short combat distance and proposed to lighten the projectiles in order to ensure greater initial speed and greater flatness of the trajectory at short distances, i.e. so that it is more likely to hit the target and penetrate armor better. But because Since the battle distances for the Russo-Japanese War increased, this backfired, because a lighter projectile no longer hits the target more accurately, and causes less destruction. So, but in fact it was quite non-lethal. And what was the problem with explosions, why do they like to tell us how cool the Japanese shimosa are - the fact is that we essentially only had armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells in the fleet, i.e. our shells were all designed to explode after breaking through the barrier. This is what our fuses were designed for. And the Japanese often used instantaneous fuses, i.e. we had a Brink capsule fuse, they have a fuse.... So their fuse often went off even when hitting water, so it’s cool, everything explodes, special effects, like in a Hollywood film. And at the same time, the Japanese have shells with thin walls and thicker walls, i.e. high-explosive and semi-armor-piercing, but we have thicker walls and very thick walls, i.e. semi-armor-piercing and armor-piercing. Therefore, the effect from our explosions is much less, but the impact on the target, in principle, it all depends on the target, no matter what, our shells were, in general, no less effective than the Japanese ones. Those. there is a legend here with the fact that we lost due to bad shells, it... to put it mildly, it was necessary to find some kind of justification. Because then ours made very long and very heavy shells in the First World War, but it still didn’t help us win. It's not the shells that matter, apparently. No, well, our shells were not bad, we just had to use them correctly, like any weapon. Well, here’s the picture, strictly speaking: we have a huge army, a larger fleet than the Japanese, but in the Pacific Ocean our ground forces are several times smaller than the Japanese, and the fleet is approximately equal to the Japanese. We have a more diverse fleet and with a large percentage of slow-moving ships, the Japanese have a better picture in this regard, well, if you don’t take their Chinese trophies, and most importantly, the Japanese have practically the same type and with approximately the same speed, quite high battleships and armored cruisers. We have much more diversity here. And in the ground forces we are qualitatively lagging behind the Japanese only in that we do not have mountain artillery. The Japanese are lagging behind in that they have a much worse field gun. This is what we came up with in terms of the balance of forces and in terms of armaments in the Russo-Japanese War. What next - has the war already begun and how did it all go? Yes, I also thought that in one or two videos we would talk about the very course of the war, i.e. how the war went. Clear. Thank you, Boris Vitalievich. And that’s all for today, see you again.

"Gromoboy" became the last cruiser in the history of the Russian fleet, built in accordance with the ideas of cruising doctrine. This sonorous name fully corresponded to the appearance of the ship: a four-tube, high-sided giant 140 meters long with strong artillery and armor. It was the third and most advanced in a series of highly autonomous raiders.

The founder of the series, with his appearance, caused a stir in the naval circles of England - a longtime enemy of the Russian Empire. In response, the “mistress of the seas” was forced to begin building the monstrously expensive cruisers “Powerfull” and “Terrible” with a displacement of more than 14,000 tons (in the British Navy itself they will be called “white elephants”). At the celebrations dedicated to the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, "Rurik" will be in the spotlight, journalists will call it "the pearl of the Kiel squadron" 1. After "Rurik" a second similar, but much more advanced cruiser "Russia" will be built, followed by construction of the Thunderbolt, the best ship in the series. "Gromoboy" will be part of the Russian navy for more than 20 years and will withstand the trials of these two wars with dignity. One can only regret that until now the history of the creation and long service of this wonderful ship has not become the topic of a separate historical study. True, it cannot be said that “Thunderbolt” was completely deprived of the attention of historians. V.E. Egoriev, in his monograph devoted to the actions of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, pays a lot of attention to the “Thunderbolt”2. To date, this work is the best study of the operations of a separate detachment of cruisers (Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboy, etc.) in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Moreover, the value of V.E.’s work Egoriev is also due to the fact that the author himself, being a midshipman of the Russian Navy during the period of the events described, personally participated in all combat operations of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment and therefore describes their actions not only as a researcher, but also as an eyewitness. However, the work of V.E. Egoryeva has long become a bibliographic rarity.
The outstanding Russian naval historian P.M. wrote in sufficient detail about the construction and service of the Thunderbolt. Melnikov in his book
The same author briefly describes the construction of the Thunderbolt in his.
It should also be noted the excellent article dedicated to this cruiser, written by L.A. Kuznetsov and published in the magazine "Shipbuilding" No. 12 for 1989.

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (1895-1900)

EVOLUTION OF AN ARMORED CRUISER IN THE RUSSIAN FLEET AT THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY

"RURIK" - "RUSSIA" - "CRUISER No. 3"

ON THE SHAPE

LAUNCHING, COMPLETION AND TESTING

Chapter II. ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN (1900-1905)

TRANSITION TO THE FAR EAST

SERVICE IN THE FAR EAST

IN THE WAR WITH JAPAN

Chapter III. IN THE BALTIC (1905-1922)

RETURN

REPAIR AND MODERNIZATION

APPLICATION

HOW "THUNDERBOY" WAS CONSTRUCTED

LITERATURE AND SOURCES